ECJ case law

In this section a selection is offered ECJ case law on the Regulations of the European Union on family and inheritance matters.

ECJ case law concerning Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, of 27 November 2003, concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/200

 

About the scope of application of Regulation 2201/2003 and the subjects included in the concept of parental responsibility

 

Judgment of 27 November 2007, C-435/06, C.: “Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2116/2004 of 2 December 2004, is to be interpreted to the effect that a single decision ordering a child to be taken into care and placed outside his original home in a foster family is covered by the term ‘civil matters’ for the purposes of that provision, where that decision was adopted in the context of public law rules relating to child protection”.

Judgment of 2 April 2009, C-523/07, A.: “Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a decision ordering that a child be immediately taken into care and placed outside his original home is covered by the term ‘civil matters’, for the purposes of that provision, where that decision was adopted in the context of public law rules relating to child protection…”.

Judgment of 5 October 2010, C‑400/10 PPU, McB: “Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from providing by its law that the acquisition of rights of custody by a child’s father, where he is not married to the child’s mother, is dependent on the father’s obtaining a judgment from a national court with jurisdiction awarding such rights to him, on the basis of which the removal of the child by its mother or the retention of that child may be considered wrongful, within the meaning of Article 2(11) of that regulation”.

Judgment of 26 April 2012, C-92/12, Health Service Executive: “A judgment of a court of a Member State which orders the placement of child in a secure institution providing therapeutic and educational care situated in another Member State and which entails that, for her own protection, the child is deprived of her liberty for a specified period, falls within the material scope of Council Regulation No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000…”

Judgment of 9 September 2015, C‑4/14, Bohez: “1. Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that that regulation does not apply to the enforcement in a Member State of a penalty payment which is imposed in a judgment, given in another Member State, concerning rights of custody and rights of access in order to ensure that the holder of the rights of custody complies with those rights of access. 2. Recovery of a penalty payment — a penalty which the court of the Member State of origin that gave judgment on the merits with regard to rights of access has imposed in order to ensure the effectiveness of those rights — forms part of the same scheme of enforcement as the judgment concerning the rights of access that the penalty safeguards and the latter must therefore be declared enforceable in accordance with the rules laid down by Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. 3. In the context of Regulation No 2201/2003, a foreign judgment which orders a periodic penalty payment is enforceable in the Member State in which enforcement is sought only if the amount of the payment has been finally determined by the courts of the Member State of origin”.

Judgment of 6 October 2015, C‑404/14, Marie Matoušková:Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that the approval of an agreement for the sharing-out of an estate concluded by a guardian ad litem on behalf of minor children constitutes a measure relating to the exercise of parental responsibility, within the meaning of Article 1(1)(b) of that regulation and thus falls within the scope of the latter, and not a measure relating to succession, within the meaning of Article 1(3)(f) thereof, excluded from the scope thereof”.

Judgment of 21 October 2015, C‑215/15, Gogova: “1. An action in which one parent asks the court to remedy the lack of agreement of the other parent to their child travelling outside his Member State of residence and a passport being issued in the child’s name is within the material scope of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, even though the decision in that action will have to be taken into account by the authorities of the Member State of which the child is a national in the administrative procedure for the issue of that passport…”.

Judgment of 31 May 2018, C‑335/17, Valcheva: “The concept of ‘rights of access’ referred to in Article 1(2)(a) and in Article 2.7 and 2.10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as including rights of access of grandparents to their grandchildren”.

Order of 3 October 2019, C-759/18, OF v. PG: “…4. The concept of ‘parental responsibility’, as defined in Regulation No 2201/2003, must be interpreted as covering decisions relating to, in particular, custody of the child and the child’s place of habitual residence, but it does not include parental contributions towards the costs of the child’s care and upbringing, which is covered by the concept of ‘maintenance obligations’ and comes within the scope of Regulation No 4/2009”.

 

About the jurisdiction rules on matrimonial matters.

 

Judgment of 29 November 2007, C‑68/07, Sundelind López: “Articles 6 and 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2116/2004 of 2 December 2004, as regards treaties with the Holy See, are to be interpreted as meaning that where, in divorce proceedings, a respondent is not habitually resident in a Member State and is not a national of a Member State, the courts of a Member State cannot base their jurisdiction to hear the petition on their national law, if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction under Article 3 of that regulation”.

Judgment of 16 July 2009, C‑168/08, Hadadi: “1. Where the court of the Member State addressed must verify, pursuant to Article 64(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, whether the court of the Member State of origin of a judgment would have had jurisdiction under Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, the latter provision precludes the court of the Member State addressed from regarding spouses who each hold the nationality both of that State and of the Member State of origin as nationals only of the Member State addressed. That court must, on the contrary, take into account the fact that the spouses also hold the nationality of the Member State of origin and that, therefore, the courts of the latter could have had jurisdiction to hear the case. 2. Where spouses each hold the nationality of the same two Member States, Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 precludes the jurisdiction of the courts of one of those Member States from being rejected on the ground that the applicant does not put forward other links with that State. On the contrary, the courts of those Member States of which the spouses hold the nationality have jurisdiction under that provision and the spouses may seise the court of the Member State of their choice”.

Judgment of 13 October 2016, C‑294/15, Mikołajczyk: “1. Article 1(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that an action for annulment of marriage brought by a third party following the death of one of the spouses falls within the scope of Regulation No 2201/2003. 2. The fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a person other than one of the spouses who brings an action for annulment of marriage may not rely on the grounds of jurisdiction set out in those provisions”.

Order of 3 October 2019, C-759/18, OF v. PG: “1. Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of an application for divorce, where the applicant brings proceedings before a court of the Member State of the spouses’ common nationality, although their habitual residence is in another Member State, that court has jurisdiction to rule on that application pursuant to point (b) of that provision. As the defendant is not required to give consent, it is not necessary to examine whether a failure on the part of the defendant to raise an objection that that court lacks jurisdiction constitutes tacit consent to the court seised having jurisdiction. 2. Article 3(1) and Article 17 of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the fact that the couple seeking dissolution of their marriage have a minor child is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the court having jurisdiction to rule on the application for divorce. Since the court of the Member State of the spouses’ common nationality, seised by the applicant, has jurisdiction to rule on that application under Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, that court cannot, even where there is no agreement between the parties on the matter, raise an objection that it lacks international jurisdiction…”

Judgment of 25 November 2021, C-289/20, IB: “Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a spouse who divides his or her time between two Member States may have his or her habitual residence in only one of those Member States, with the result that only the courts of the Member State in which that habitual residence is situated have jurisdiction to rule on the application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties”.

 

About the general jurisdiction rule on parental responsibility issues. The concept of habitual residence.

 

Judgment of 2 April 2009, C-523/07, A.: ”…2) The concept of ‘habitual residence’ under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that it corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment. To that end, in particular the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the family’s move to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that State must be taken into consideration. It is for the national court to establish the habitual residence of the child, taking account of all the circumstances specific to each individual case…”

Judgment of 22 December 2010, C‑497/10 PPU, Mercredi: “1. The concept of ‘habitual residence’, for the purposes of Articles 8 and 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that such residence corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment. To that end, where the situation concerned is that of an infant who has been staying with her mother only a few days in a Member State – other than that of her habitual residence – to which she has been removed, the factors which must be taken into consideration include, first, the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay in the territory of that Member State and for the mother’s move to that State and, second, with particular reference to the child’s age, the mother’s geographic and family origins and the family and social connections which the mother and child have with that Member State. It is for the national court to establish the habitual residence of the child, taking account of all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual case. If the application of the abovementioned tests were, in the case in the main proceedings, to lead to the conclusion that the child’s habitual residence cannot be established, which court has jurisdiction would have to be determined on the basis of the criterion of the child’s presence, under Article 13 of the Regulation…”.

Judgment of 15 February 2017, C-499/15, W and V: “Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the courts of the Member State which made a decision that has become final concerning parental responsibility and maintenance obligations with regard to a minor child no longer have jurisdiction to decide on an application for variation of the provisions ordered in that decision, inasmuch as the habitual residence of the child is in another Member State. It is the courts of the Member State of habitual residence that have jurisdiction to decide on that application”.

Judgment of 8 June 2017, C‑111/17 PPU, OL: “Article 11(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation, such as that in the main proceedings, where a child has been born and has lived continuously with her mother for several months, in accordance with the joint wishes of her parents, in a Member State other than that where those parents were habitually resident before her birth, the initial intention of the parents with respect to the return of the mother, together with the child, to the latter Member State cannot allow the conclusion that that child was ‘habitually resident’ there, within the meaning of that regulation. Consequently, in such a situation, the refusal of the mother to return to the latter Member State together with the child cannot be considered to be a ‘wrongful removal or retention’ of the child, within the meaning of Article 11(1)”.

Judgment of 28 June 2018, C‑512/17, HR: “Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a child’s place of habitual residence for the purpose of that regulation is the place which, in practice, is the centre of that child’s life. It is for the national court to determine, on the basis of a consistent body of evidence, where that centre was located at the time the application concerning parental responsibility over the child was submitted. In that regard, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, having regard to the facts established by that court, the following, taken together, are decisive factors: – the fact that, from its birth until its parents’ separation, the child generally lived with those parents in a specific place; – the fact that the parent who, in practice, has had custody of the child since the couple’s separation continues to stay in that place with the child on a daily basis and is employed there under an employment contract of indefinite duration; and – the fact that the child has regular contact there with its other parent, who is still resident in that place. By contrast, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the following cannot be regarded as decisive: – the stays which the parent who, in practice, has custody of the child has spent in the past with that child in the territory of that parent’s Member State of origin in the context of leave periods or holidays; – the origins of the parent in question, the cultural ties which the child has with that Member State as a result, and the parent’s relationships with family residing in that Member State; and – any intention the parent has of settling in that Member State with the child in the future”.

Judgment of 17 October 2018, C‑393/18 PPU, UD: “Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted to the effect that a child must have been physically present in a Member State in order to be regarded as habitually resident in that Member State, for the purposes of that provision. Circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, assuming that they are proven, that is to say, first, the fact that the father’s coercion of the mother had the effect of her giving birth to their child in a third country where she has resided with that child ever since, and, secondly, the breach of the mother’s or the child’s rights, do not have any bearing in that regard”.

 

About the special jurisdiction rules in parental responsibility issues.

 

Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction and the return of the child

Order of 10 April 2018, C‑85/18 PPU, CV:Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a child who was habitually resident in a Member State was wrongfully removed by one of the parents to another Member State, the courts of that other Member State do not have jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to custody or the determination of a maintenance allowance with respect to that child, in the absence of any indication that the other parent consented to his removal or did not bring an application for the return of that child”.

Judgment of 9 October 2014, C‑376/14 PPU, C: “1. Articles 2(11) and 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that where the removal of a child has taken place in accordance with a judgment which was provisionally enforceable and which was thereafter overturned by a judgment which fixed the residence of the child at the home of the parent living in the Member State of origin, the court of the Member State to which the child was removed, seised of an application for the return of the child, must determine, by undertaking an assessment of all the circumstances of fact specific to the individual case, whether the child was still habitually resident in the Member State of origin immediately before the alleged wrongful retention. As part of that assessment, it is important that account be taken of the fact that the judgment authorising the removal could be provisionally enforced and that an appeal had been brought against it. 2. Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where the removal of a child has taken place in accordance with a court judgment which was provisionally enforceable and which was thereafter overturned by a court judgment fixing the child’s residence at the home of the parent living in the Member State of origin, the failure to return the child to that Member State following the latter judgment is wrongful and Article 11 of the Regulation is applicable if it is held that the child was still habitually resident in that Member State immediately before the retention. If it is held, conversely, that the child was at that time no longer habitually resident in the Member State of origin, a decision dismissing the application for return based on that provision is without prejudice to the application of the rules established in Chapter III of the Regulation relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State”.

Judgment of 9 January 2015, C‑498/14 PPU, Bradbrooke: “Article 11(7) and (8) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as not precluding, as a general rule, a Member State from allocating to a specialised court the jurisdiction to examine questions of return or custody with respect to a child in the context of the procedure set out in those provisions, even where proceedings on the substance of parental responsibility with respect to the child have already, separately, been brought before a court or tribunal”.

Judgment of 24 March 2021, C-603/20 PPU, MCP: “Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2116/2004 of 2 December 2004, must be interpreted as meaning that it is not applicable to a situation where a finding is made that a child has, at the time when an application relating to parental responsibility is brought, acquired his or her habitual residence in a third State following abduction to that State. In that situation, the jurisdiction of the court seised will have to be determined in accordance with the applicable international conventions, or, in the absence of any such international convention, in accordance with Article 14 of that regulation”.

Judgment of 2 August 2021, C-262/21 PPU, A: “Article 2(11) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that the situation in which one parent, without the consent of the other parent, is led to take his or her child from his or her Member State of habitual residence to another Member State in application of a transfer decision, made by the former Member State on the basis of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, and then to remain in the latter Member State after that transfer decision has been annulled without the authorities of the former Member State deciding to take back the persons transferred or to grant them residence, cannot constitute a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of that provision”.

Prorogation of jurisdiction

Judgment of 1 October 2014, C-436/13, E:Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility which has been prorogued, under Article 12(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, in favour of a court of a Member State before which proceedings have been brought by mutual agreement by the holders of parental responsibility ceases following a final judgment in those proceedings”.

Judgment of 12 November 2014, C-656/13, L: “1. Article 12(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as allowing, for the purposes of proceedings in matters of parental responsibility, the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State which is not that of the child’s habitual residence to be established even where no other proceedings are pending before the court chosen. 2. Article 12(3)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be considered that the jurisdiction of the court seised by one party of proceedings in matters of parental responsibility has been ‘accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings’ within the meaning of that provision where the defendant in those first proceedings subsequently brings a second set of proceedings before the same court and, on taking the first step required of him in the first proceedings, pleads the lack of jurisdiction of that court”.

Judgment of 21 October 2015, C‑215/15, Gogova: “…2. Article 12(3)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the jurisdiction of the courts seised of an application in matters of parental responsibility may not be regarded as having been ‘accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings’ within the meaning of that provision solely because the legal representative of the defendant, appointed by those courts of their own motion in view of the impossibility of serving the document instituting proceedings on the defendant, has not pleaded the lack of jurisdiction of those courts”.

Order of 16 January 2018, C-604/17, PM: “Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State with jurisdiction, under Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, to hear and determine an application for divorce between two spouses who are nationals of that Member State does not have jurisdiction to rule on rights of custody and rights of access in respect of the spouses’ child in the case where, at the time when the court is seised, that child is habitually resident in another Member State, that the conditions for such jurisdiction, under Article 12 of that regulation, are not satisfied by that court, and that, on account of the circumstances of the main proceedings, it follows that neither does that court have such jurisdiction under Articles 9, 10 or 15 of that regulation. Furthermore, that court does not satisfy the conditions, laid down in Article 3(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, for having jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to maintenance”

Judgment of 19 April 2018, C‑565/16, Saponaro: “In a situation, such as that in the main proceedings, where the parents of a minor child, who are habitually resident with the latter in a Member State, have lodged, in the name of that child, an application for permission to renounce an inheritance before the courts of another Member State, Article 12(3)(b) of Council Regulation No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning: – the joint lodging of proceedings by the parents of the child before the courts of their choice is an unequivocal acceptance by them of that court; – a prosecutor who, according to the national law, has the capacity of a party to the proceedings commenced by the parents, is a party to the proceedings within the meaning of Article 12(3)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003. Opposition by that party to the choice of jurisdiction made by the parents of the child in question, after the date on which the court was seised, precludes the acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings at that date from being established. In the absence of such opposition, the agreement of that party may be regarded as implicit and the condition of the unequivocal acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings at the date on which that court was seised may be held to be satisfied; and – the fact that the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, his assets, which are the subject matter of the succession, and the liabilities of the succession were situated in the Member State of the chosen courts leads, in the absence of matters that might demonstrate that the prorogation of jurisdiction was liable to have a prejudicial impact on the child’s position, to the conclusion that that prorogation of jurisdiction is in the best interests of the child”.

Order of 3 October 2019, C-759/18, OF v. PG: “…3. Article 12(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a court of the Member State of the spouses’ common nationality, seised by the applicant, has jurisdiction to rule on divorce proceedings pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003, the condition relating to the acceptance of jurisdiction laid down in Article 12(1)(b) of that regulation cannot be regarded as satisfied where parental responsibility is not the subject of the proceedings and the defendant has not entered an appearance. In that situation, the court seised, which has jurisdiction to rule on the divorce of the spouses, does not have jurisdiction under Article 12(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 and Article 3(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations to rule on issues relating to parental responsibility and maintenance obligations, respectively, in respect of the child concerned”.

Transfer to a court better placed to hear the case

Judgment of 27 October 2016, C‑428/15, D: “1. Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that it is applicable where a child protection application brought under public law by the competent authority of a Member State concerns the adoption of measures relating to parental responsibility, such as the application at issue in the main proceedings, where it is a necessary consequence of a court of another Member State assuming jurisdiction that an authority of that other Member State thereafter commence proceedings that are separate from those brought in the first Member State, pursuant to its own domestic law and possibly relating to different factual circumstances. 2. Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that: – in order to determine that a court of another Member State with which the child has a particular connection is better placed, the court having jurisdiction in a Member State must be satisfied that the transfer of the case to that other court is such as to provide genuine and specific added value to the examination of that case, taking into account, inter alia, the rules of procedure applicable in that other Member State; – in order to determine that such a transfer is in the best interests of the child, the court having jurisdiction in a Member State must be satisfied, in particular, that that transfer is not liable to be detrimental to the situation of the child. 3. Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the court having jurisdiction in a Member State must not take into account, when applying that provision in a given case relating to parental responsibility, either the effect of a possible transfer of that case to a court of another Member State on the right of freedom of movement of persons concerned other than the child in question, or the reason why the mother of that child exercised that right, prior to that court being seised, unless those considerations are such that there may be adverse repercussions on the situation of that child.

Judgment of 4 October 2018, C‑478/17, IQ: “Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as not applying in circumstances, such as those in the main proceedings, in which both courts seised have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter under Articles 12 and 8, respectively, of that regulation”.

Order of 10 July 2019, C-530/18, EP v. FP: “1. Article 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted to the effect that it establishes an exception to the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 8 of Regulation No 2201/2003, according to which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States is determined by the place where the child is habitually resident at the time the courts are seised. 2. Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted to the effect that, if one or more of the five alternative criteria which it lays down exhaustively in order to assess whether the child has a particular connection to another Member State, other than the State of her habitual residence, are satisfied, the court having jurisdiction by virtue of Article 8(1) of that regulation has the option to transfer the case to a court which it considers to be better placed to deal with the dispute before it, but is not obliged to do so. If the court having jurisdiction reaches the conclusion that the relations which link the child concerned to the Member State of her habitual residence are stronger than those which link her to another Member State, that conclusion is sufficient to rule out the application of Article 15 of that regulation. 3. Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted to the effect that the existence of differences between the rules of law, in particular the rules of procedure, of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case and those of another Member State with which the child concerned has a particular connection, such as the examination of cases in camera by specialist judges, does not constitute, in a general and abstract way, a relevant criterion, in light of the best interests of the child, when assessing whether the courts of that Member State are better placed to hear that case. The court having jurisdiction may take those differences into consideration only if they are such as to provide genuine and specific added value with respect to the decision to be taken in relation to that child, as compared with the possibility of the case remaining before that court”.

 

About provisional, including protective, measures

 

Judgment of 2 April 2009, C-523/07, A.: ”…3. A protective measure, such as the taking into care of children, may be decided by a national court under Article 20 of Regulation No 2201/2003 if the following conditions are satisfied: – the measure must be urgent; – it must be taken in respect of persons in the Member State concerned, and – it must be provisional. 4. The taking of the measure and its binding nature are determined in accordance with national law. After the protective measure has been taken, the national court is not required to transfer the case to the court of another Member State having jurisdiction. However, in so far as the protection of the best interests of the child so requires, the national court which has taken provisional or protective measures must inform, directly or through the central authority designated under Article 53 of Regulation No 2201/2003, the court of another Member State having jurisdiction. 5. Where the court of a Member State does not have jurisdiction at all, it must declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction, but is not required to transfer the case to another court. However, in so far as the protection of the best interests of the child so requires, the national court which has declared of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction must inform, directly or through the central authority designated under Article 53 of Regulation No 2201/2003, the court of another Member State having jurisdiction”.

Judgment of 23 December 2009, C‑403/09 PPU, Detiček: “Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as not allowing, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, a court of a Member State to take a provisional measure in matters of parental responsibility granting custody of a child who is in the territory of that Member State to one parent, where a court of another Member State, which has jurisdiction under that regulation as to the substance of the dispute relating to custody of the child, has already delivered a judgment provisionally giving custody of the child to the other parent, and that judgment has been declared enforceable in the territory of the former Member State”.

Judgment of 15 July 2010, C‑256/09, Purrucker: “The provisions laid down in Article 21 et seq. of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, do not apply to provisional measures, relating to rights of custody, falling within the scope of Article 20 of that regulation”.

 

About lis pendens and the moment in which a court shall be deemed to be seised

 

Judgment of 9 November 2010, C‑296/10, Purrucker: “The provisions of Article 19(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, are not applicable where a court of a Member State first seised for the purpose of obtaining measures in matters of parental responsibility is seised only for the purpose of its granting provisional measures within the meaning of Article 20 of that regulation and where a court of another Member State which has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter within the meaning of the same regulation is seised second of an action directed at obtaining the same measures, whether on a provisional basis or as final measures. The fact that a court of a Member State is seised in the context of proceedings to obtain interim relief or that a judgment is handed down in the context of such proceedings and there is nothing in the action brought or the judgment handed down which indicates that the court seised for the interim measures has jurisdiction within the meaning of Regulation No 2201/2003 does not necessarily preclude the possibility that, as may be provided for by the national law of that Member State, there may be an action as to the substance of the matter which is linked to the action to obtain interim measures and in which there is evidence to demonstrate that the court seised has jurisdiction within the meaning of that regulation. Where, notwithstanding efforts made by the court second seised to obtain information by enquiry of the party claiming lis pendens, the court first seised and the central authority, the court second seised lacks any evidence which enables it to determine the cause of action of proceedings brought before another court and which serves, in particular, to demonstrate the jurisdiction of that court in accordance with Regulation No 2201/2003, and where, because of specific circumstances, the interest of the child requires the handing down of a judgment which may be recognised in Member States other than that of the court second seised, it is the duty of that court, after the expiry of a reasonable period in which answers to the enquiries made are awaited, to proceed with consideration of the action brought before it. The duration of that reasonable period must take into account the best interests of the child in the specific circumstances of the proceedings concerned”.

Order of 16 July 2015, C‑507/14, P:Article 16(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 must be interpreted as meaning that a court is deemed to be seised at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with that court, even where the proceedings have in the meantime been stayed at the initiative of the applicant who brought them, without those proceedings having been notified to the defendant or that defendant having had knowledge of them or having intervened in them in any way, provided that the applicant has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the respondent”.

Judgment of 6 October 2015, C‑489/14, A: “In the case of judicial separation and divorce proceedings brought between the same parties before the courts of two Member States, Article 19(1) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings in which the proceedings before the court first seised in the first Member State expired after the second court in the second Member State was seised, the criteria for lis pendens are no longer fulfilled and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the court first seised must be regarded as not being established”.

Order of 22 June 2016, C‑173/16, M. H.: “Article 16(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted to the effect that the ‘time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court’, within the meaning of that provision, is the time when that document is lodged with the court concerned, even if under national law lodging that document does not of itself immediately initiate proceedings”.

 

About the recognition and enforcement of judgments.

 

Judgment of 11 July 2008, C‑195/08 PPU, Inga Rinau: “1. Once a non‑return decision has been taken and brought to the attention of the court of origin, it is irrelevant, for the purposes of issuing the certificate provided for in Article 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, that that decision has been suspended, overturned, set aside or, in any event, has not become res judicata or has been replaced by a decision ordering return, in so far as the return of the child has not actually taken place. Since no doubt has been expressed as regards the authenticity of that certificate and since it was drawn up in accordance with the standard form set out in Annex IV to the Regulation, opposition to the recognition of the decision ordering return is not permitted and it is for the requested court only to declare the enforceability of the certified decision and to allow the immediate return of the child. 2. Except where the procedure concerns a decision certified pursuant to Articles 11(8) and 40 to 42 of Regulation No 2201/2003, any interested party can apply for non‑recognition of a judicial decision, even if no application for recognition of the decision has been submitted beforehand. 3. Article 31(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, in so far as it provides that neither the person against whom enforcement is sought, nor the child is, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to make any submissions on the application, is not applicable to proceedings initiated for non‑recognition of a judicial decision if no application for recognition has been lodged beforehand in respect of that decision. In such a situation, the defendant, who is seeking recognition, is entitled to make such submissions”.

Judgment of 1 July 2010, C‑211/10 PPU, Povse:1. Article 10(b)(iv) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a provisional measure does not constitute a ‘judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child’ within the meaning of that provision, and cannot be the basis of a transfer of jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State to which the child has been unlawfully removed. 2. Article 11(8) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment of the court with jurisdiction ordering the return of the child falls within the scope of that provision, even if it is not preceded by a final judgment of that court relating to rights of custody of the child. 3. The second subparagraph of Article 47(2) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment delivered subsequently by a court in the Member State of enforcement which awards provisional rights of custody and is deemed to be enforceable under the law of that State cannot preclude enforcement of a certified judgment delivered previously by the court which has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin and ordering the return of the child. 4. Enforcement of a certified judgment cannot be refused in the Member State of enforcement because, as a result of a subsequent change of circumstances, it might be seriously detrimental to the best interests of the child. Such a change must be pleaded before the court which has jurisdiction in the Member State of origin, which should also hear any application to suspend enforcement of its judgment”.

Judgment of 22 December 2010, C‑491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga:In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, the court with jurisdiction in the Member State of enforcement cannot oppose the enforcement of a certified judgment, ordering the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed, on the ground that the court of the Member State of origin which handed down that judgment may have infringed Article 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, interpreted in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since the assessment of whether there is such an infringement falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of origin”.

Judgment of 19 November 2015, C-455/15 PPU, P: “Article 23(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of a manifest breach, having regard to the best interests of the child, of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of a Member State or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order, that provision does not allow a court of that Member State which considers that it has jurisdiction to rule on the custody of a child to refuse to recognise a judgment of a court of another Member State which has ruled on the custody of that child”.

Judgment of 19 September 2018, C‑325/18 PPU, C‑375/18 PPU, C.E. and N.E.: “1. The general provisions of Chapter III of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that, where it is alleged that children have been wrongfully removed, the decision of a court of the Member State in which those children were habitually resident, directing that those children be returned and which is entailed by a decision dealing with parental responsibility, may be declared enforceable in the host Member State in accordance with those general provisions. 2. Article 33(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, enforcement of a decision of a court of a Member State which directs that children be made wards of court and that they be returned and which is declared enforceable in the requested Member State, prior to service of the declaration of enforceability of that decision on the parents concerned. Article 33(5) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the period for lodging an appeal laid down in that provision may not be extended by the court seised. 3. Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as not precluding, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, a court of one Member State from adopting protective measures in the form of an injunction directed at a public body of another Member State, preventing that body from commencing or continuing, before the courts of that other Member State, proceedings for the adoption of children who are residing there”.

Judgment of 16 January 2019, C‑386/17, Liberato: “The rules of lis pendens in Article 27 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and Article 19 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 must be interpreted as meaning that where, in a dispute in matrimonial matters, parental responsibility or maintenance obligations, the court second seised, in breach of those rules, delivers a judgment which becomes final, those articles preclude the courts of the Member State in which the court first seised is situated from refusing to recognise that judgment solely for that reason. In particular, that breach cannot, in itself, justify non-recognition of a judgment on the ground that it is manifestly contrary to public policy in that Member State”.

 

ECJ Case Law concerning Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009, of 18 December 2008, on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations

 

About the jurisdiction rules.

 

Judgment of 18 December 2014, C-400/13 and C-408/13, Sanders and Huber: “Article 3(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which establishes a centralisation of judicial jurisdiction in matters relating to cross-border maintenance obligations in favour of a first instance court which has jurisdiction for the seat of the appeal court, except where that rule helps to achieve the objective of a proper administration of justice and protects the interests of maintenance creditors while promoting the effective recovery of such claims, which is, however, a matter for the referring courts to verify”.

Judgment of 16 July 2015, C-184/14, A: “Article 3(c) and (d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations must be understood as meaning that, in the event that a court of a Member State is seised of proceedings involving the separation or dissolution of a marital link between the parents of a minor child and a court of another Member State is seised of proceedings in matters of parental responsibility involving that same child, an application relating to maintenance concerning that child is ancillary only to the proceedings concerning parental responsibility, within the meaning of Article 3(d) of that regulation”.

Judgment of 15 February 2017, C-499/15, W and V: “Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the courts of the Member State which made a decision that has become final concerning parental responsibility and maintenance obligations with regard to a minor child no longer have jurisdiction to decide on an application for variation of the provisions ordered in that decision, inasmuch as the habitual residence of the child is in another Member State. It is the courts of the Member State of habitual residence that have jurisdiction to decide on that application”.

Order of 16 January 2018, C-604/17, PM: “Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State with jurisdiction, under Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, to hear and determine an application for divorce between two spouses who are nationals of that Member State does not have jurisdiction to rule on rights of custody and rights of access in respect of the spouses’ child in the case where, at the time when the court is seised, that child is habitually resident in another Member State, that the conditions for such jurisdiction, under Article 12 of that regulation, are not satisfied by that court, and that, on account of the circumstances of the main proceedings, it follows that neither does that court have such jurisdiction under Articles 9, 10 or 15 of that regulation. Furthermore, that court does not satisfy the conditions, laid down in Article 3(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, for having jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to maintenance”.

Order of 10 April 2018, C-85/18 PPU, CV: “Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a child who was habitually resident in a Member State was wrongfully removed by one of the parents to another Member State, the courts of that other Member State do not have jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to custody or the determination of a maintenance allowance with respect to that child, in the absence of any indication that the other parent consented to his removal or did not bring an application for the return of that child”

Judgment of 5 September 2019, C-468/18, R (Jurisdiction for Parental Responsibility and Maintenance): “Article 3(a) and (d) and Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations must be interpreted as meaning that where there is an action before a court of a Member State which includes three claims concerning, respectively, the divorce of the parents of a minor child, parental responsibility in respect of that child and the maintenance obligation with regard to that child, the court ruling on the divorce, which has declared that it has no jurisdiction to rule on the claim concerning parental responsibility, nevertheless has jurisdiction to rule on the claim concerning the maintenance obligation with regard to that child where it is also the court for the place where the defendant is habitually resident or the court before which the defendant has entered an appearance, without contesting the jurisdiction of that court”

Judgment of 17 September 2020, C-540/19, Landkreis Harburg (Subrogation of a public body to the claims of a maintenance creditor): “A public body which seeks to recover, by way of an action for recovery, sums paid in place of maintenance to a maintenance creditor, and to which the claims of that maintenance creditor against the maintenance debtor have been transferred by way of subrogation, may validly invoke the jurisdiction of the court for the place where the creditor is habitually resident, as provided in Article 3(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations”.

 

About the recognition and enforcement of judgments.

 

Judgment of 9 February 2017, C-283/16, S: “1. Chapter IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, in particular Article 41(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a maintenance creditor who has obtained an order in one Member State and wishes to enforce it in another Member State may make an application directly to the competent authority of the latter Member State, such as a specialised court, and cannot be required to submit the application to that court through the Central Authority of the Member State of enforcement. 2. Member States are required to give full effect to the right laid down in Article 41(1) of Regulation No 4/2009 by amending, where appropriate, their rules of procedure. In any event, it is for the national court to apply Article 41(1), if necessary refusing to apply any conflicting provision of national law and, as a consequence, to allow a maintenance creditor to submit her application directly to the competent authority of the Member State of enforcement, even if national law does not make provision for such an application”.

Judgment of 4 June 2020, C-41/19, FX (Opposing enforcement of a maintenance claim): “Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations is to be interpreted as meaning that an application opposing enforcement brought by the maintenance debtor against enforcement of a decision given by a court of the Member State of origin and which established that debt, which has a close link with the procedure for enforcement, falls within its scope and is within the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of enforcement. Pursuant to Article 41(1) of Regulation No 4/2009 and to the relevant provisions of national law, it is for the referring court, being a court of the Member State of enforcement, to adjudicate on the admissibility and the validity of the evidence adduced by the maintenance debtor, seeking to support the submission that he has predominantly discharged his debt”.

Judgment of 15 April 2021, C-729/19, Department of Justice for Northern Ireland: “1. Article 75(2)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations must be interpreted as applying only to decisions given by national courts in States which were already members of the European Union on the date of adoption of those decisions. 2. Regulation No 4/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that no provision of that regulation enables decisions in matters relating to maintenance obligations, given in a State before its accession to the European Union and before the date of application of that regulation, to be recognised and enforced, after that State’s accession to the European Union, in another Member State”.

 

ECJ case Law concerning Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations

Judgment of 7 June 2018, C-83/17, KP: “1. Article 4(2) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2009/941/EC of 30 November 2009 must be interpreted as meaning that: – the fact that the State of the forum corresponds to the State of the creditor’s habitual residence does not preclude the application of that provision as long as the law designated by the ancillary connecting rule in that provision does not coincide with the law designated by the main connecting rule in Article 3 of that Protocol; – in a situation in which the maintenance creditor, who has changed his habitual residence, has brought before the courts of the State of his new habitual residence a maintenance claim against the debtor in respect of a period in the past during which the creditor resided in another Member State, the law of the forum, which is also the law of the State of the creditor’s new habitual residence, can apply provided the courts of the Member State of the forum had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the disputes concerning those parties as to the maintenance relating to that period. The phrase ‘is unable … to obtain maintenance’ in Article 4(2) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 must be interpreted as also covering the situation in which the creditor is unable to obtain maintenance under the law of the State of his previous habitual residence on the ground that he does not meet certain conditions imposed by that law”.

Judgment of 20 September 2018, C-214/17, Mölk: “1. On a proper construction of Article 4(3) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2009/941/EC of 30 November 2009, the result of a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where the maintenance to be paid was set by a decision, which has acquired the force of res judicata, in response to an application by the creditor and, pursuant to Article 4(3) of that protocol, on the basis of the law of the forum designated under that provision, is not that that law governs a subsequent application for a reduction in the amount of maintenance lodged by the debtor against the creditor with the courts of the State where that debtor is habitually resident. 2. Article 4(3) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 must be interpreted as meaning that a creditor does not ‘seise’, for the purposes of that article, the competent authority of the State where the debtor has his habitual residence when that creditor, in the context of proceedings initiated by the debtor before that authority, enters an appearance, for the purposes of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, contending that the application should be dismissed on the merits.”

ECJ Case Law concerning Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010, of 20 December 2010, implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation

Judgment of 20 December 2017, C-372/16, Sahyouni: “Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation must be interpreted as meaning that a divorce resulting from a unilateral declaration made by one of the spouses before a religious court, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not come within the substantive scope of that regulation”.

Judgment of 16 July 2020, C-249/19, JE (Law applicable to divorce): “Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation must be interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘where the law applicable by virtue of Article 5 or Article 8 makes no provision for divorce’ applies only where the foreign law applicable makes no provision for divorce in any form”.

ECJ Case Law concerning Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 4 July 2012, on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession

Judgment of 12 October 2017, C‑218/16, Kubicka: “Article 1(2)(k) and (l) and Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as precluding refusal, by an authority of a Member State, to recognise the material effects of a legacy ‘by vindication’, provided for by the law governing succession chosen by the testator in accordance with Article 22(1) of that regulation, where that refusal is based on the ground that the legacy concerns the right of ownership of immovable property located in that Member State, whose law does not provide for legacies with direct material effect when succession takes place”.

Judgment of 1 March 2018, C‑558/16, Mahnkopf: “Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prescribes, on the death of one of the spouses, a fixed allocation of the accrued gains by increasing the surviving spouse’s share of the estate falls within the scope of that regulation”.

Judgment of 21 June 2018, C‑20/17, Oberle: “Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that, although the deceased did not, at the time of death, have his habitual residence in that Member State, the courts of that Member State are to retain jurisdiction to issue national certificates of succession, in the context of a succession with cross-border implications, where the assets of the estate are located in that Member State or the deceased was a national of that Member State”.

Judgment of 17 January 2019, C-102/18, Brisch: “Article 65(2) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession and Article 1(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1329/2014 of 9 December 2014 establishing the Forms referred to in Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of an application for a European Certificate of Succession, within the meaning of Article 65(2) of Regulation No 650/2012, the use of Form IV in Annex 4 to Implementing Regulation No 1329/2014 is optional”.

Judgment of 23 May 2019, C-658/17, WB: “1. The second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that failure by a Member State to notify the Commission of the exercise of judicial functions by notaries, as required under that provision, is not decisive for their classification as a ‘court’. The first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that a notary who draws up a deed of certificate of succession at the unanimous request of all the parties to the procedure conducted by the notary, such as the deed at issue in the main proceedings, does not constitute a ‘court’ within the meaning of that provision and, consequently, Article 3(1)(g) of that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that such a deed does not constitute a ‘decision’ within the meaning of that provision. 2. Article 3(1)(i) of Regulation No 650/2012 is to be interpreted as meaning that a deed of certification of succession, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, drawn up by a notary at the unanimous request of all the parties to the procedure conducted by the notary, constitutes an ‘authentic instrument’ within the meaning of that provision, which may be issued at the same time as the form referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 59(1) of that regulation, which corresponds to the form set out in Annex 2 to Implementing Regulation No 1329/2014”.

Judgment of 16 July 2020, C-80/19, E. E. (Jurisdiction and law applicable to inheritance): “1. Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which the deceased, a national of one Member State, was residing in another Member State at the date of his or her death but had not cut ties with the first of those Member States, in which the assets making up his or her estate are located, while his or her successors have their residence in both of those Member States, falls within the scope of the concept of ‘succession with cross-border implications’. The last habitual residence of the deceased, within the meaning of that regulation, must be established by the authority dealing with the succession in only one of those Member States. 2. Article 3(2) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, subject to verification by the referring court, Lithuanian notaries do not exercise judicial functions when issuing certificates of succession. However, it is for the referring court to determine whether those notaries act by delegation or under the control of a judicial authority and whether, consequently, they can be classed as ‘courts’ within the meaning of that provision. 3. Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that the referring court should find that Lithuanian notaries can be classed as ‘courts’ within the meaning of that regulation, certificates of succession that they deliver can be regarded as ‘decisions’ within the meaning of that provision, with the result that, for the purposes of issuing such certificates, those notaries can apply the rules of jurisdiction laid down in Chapter II of that regulation. 4. Articles 4 and 59 of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that notaries of a Member State, who are not classed as ‘courts’ for the purposes of that regulation, can issue national certificates of succession without applying the general rules of jurisdiction laid down by that regulation. If the referring court finds that those certificates satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 3(1)(i) of that regulation and can, therefore, be regarded as ‘authentic instruments’, within the meaning of that provision, such certificates produce, in other Member States, the effects that Article 59(1) and Article 60(1) of Regulation No 650/2012 attribute to authentic instruments. 5. Articles 4, 5, 7 and 22, together with Article 83(2) and (4), of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the testator’s wish and the agreement between his or her heirs can lead to the determination of a court having jurisdiction in matters of succession and the application of the law on succession of a Member State other than those which would result from the application of the criteria laid”.

Judgment of 1 July 2021, C-301/20, Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank: “1. Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that a certified copy of the European Certificate of Succession, bearing the words ‘unlimited duration’, is valid for a period of six months from the date of issue and produces its effects, within the meaning of Article 69 of that regulation, if it was valid when it was presented to the competent authority; 2. Article 65(1) of Regulation No 650/2012, read in conjunction with Article 69(3) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that the effects of the European Certificate of Succession are produced with respect to all persons who are named therein, even if they have not themselves requested that it be issued”.

Judgment of 9 September 2021, C-277/20, UM (Contrat translatif de propriété mortis causa): “1. Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that a contract under which a person provides for the future transfer, on death, of ownership of immovable property belonging to him or her to other parties to the contract is an agreement as to succession within the meaning of that provision. 2. Article 83(2) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply to the examination of the validity of a choice of applicable law, made before 17 August 2015, to govern only an agreement as to succession within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation, in respect of a particular asset of the deceased, and not the latter’s succession as a whole”.

Judgment of 9 September 2021, C-422/20, RK (Déclinatoire de compétence): “1. Article 7(a) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for there to have been a declining of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 6(a) of that regulation, in favour of the courts of the Member State whose law was chosen by the deceased, it is not necessary for the court previously seised to have expressly declined jurisdiction, but that intention must be unequivocally apparent from the decision that it delivered in that regard. 2. Article 6(a), Article 7(a) and Article 39 of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the court of the Member State seised following a declining of jurisdiction is not competent to examine whether the conditions set out in those provisions were satisfied in order for the court previously seised to decline jurisdiction. 3. Article 6(a) and Article 7(a) of Regulation No 650/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that the rules of jurisdiction set out in those provisions also apply in the event that, in his or her will, drawn up before 17 August 2015, the deceased had not chosen the law applicable to the succession, and that the designation of that law can be inferred from Article 83(4) of that regulation alone”.

 

 

 

Contacto

Beatriz Campuzano Díaz
Profesora Titular de Derecho Internacional Privado

Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Sevilla
Avda. Enramadilla 18-20
Sevilla 41018

+34 954 551285

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